[This project was initially proposed through Lightcone Commons, however we are still waiting for a funding decision and seeking additional support would be welcomed!]

Project summary

We are seeking USD USD 162,500 - 539,800 to support an additional year of operations of the Sequence Biosecurity Risk Consortium (SBRC). Hosted within IBBIS, the SBRC is the only international group developing standards for DNA sequence screening that can be adopted immediately by synthesis companies and policymakers. We translate organism-level biosecurity guidance, such as export control lists, into granular sequence-level screening instructions.

Why do we need a standard definition for sequences of concern?

The recent IFP / Sentinel field strategy for synthesis screening identifies “establish[ing] standards for sequence and customer screening” as a top-tier priority, with the SBRC named as a key organization working on this. We agree, because:

• Synthetic DNA is the highest-leverage chokepoint in the biological threat chain. Almost every pathway to engineering a pandemic-capable pathogen relies on synthetic nucleic acids. See screendna.org open letter by frontier lab leadership.
• Without an agreed standard, screening will be insufficient: an industry-led standard is necessary to prevent bad actors from shopping between inconsistently-screening synthesis providers, to ensure screening practices are regularly updated to keep pace with AI capabilities, and to limit disruption to beneficial biotechnology work.
• Standards enable mandatory, enforceable screening: Policymakers in multiple countries have said to SBRC moderators that our standards to advocate for mandatory screening, another top-tier priority for securing the DNA supply chain.
• A multistakeholder community can build standards fast: we need standards to support policies expected to come into effect in the US, UK, and EU in the next 12 months; IBBIS has a parallel effort on formal ISO-level international standards, but a community of experts can build standards fast enough to prevent substandard implementation that doesn’t address future biosecurity risks from being locked in.

You can read a more complete version of this argument in Creating Enforceable Biosecurity Standards for Nucleic Acid Providers (Beal & Alexanian, 2025) and hear about the technical challenges in this recent talk by Tessa Alexanian.

What the SBRC has done in the past year:

• Released screening standards classifying over 1.1 million sequences based on multistakeholder consensus. The SBRC developed sequence-level risk assessments covering all export-controlled viruses, many toxins and bacteria, and threats that are outside current regulations. See June 2026 Frontiers paper on this milestone.
• Significantly expanded membership. The SBRC has grown from an informal research collaboration to a consortium with over 30 organizations, including the International Gene Synthesis Consortium, Frontier Model Forum, and all major screening tool providers. We have collected over 100,000 USD in membership fees, and have over 40 scientific and governance experts as non-paying advisory members.
• Briefed regulators and policymakers including US NIST, BIST, and OSTP; UK DSIT; Canada PHAC; the EU Commission; the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board; and the Australia Group. Regulators have been actively integrating SBRC standards into their own standards and recommendations.
• Enabled conformity testing for screening. SBRC members can now evaluate if their screening systems are up-to-date with standards using automatically-generated test sets. These test sets are also being used by regulatory bodies to develop their own conformity assessments.

What are this project's goals? How will you achieve them?

The SBRC aims to deliver the following outcomes:

• Sequence of concern definitions that allow synthesis providers to screen confidently and consistently
• Test sets that allow regulators and developers to test conformity against standards
• Expert community to ensure screening keeps pace with AI x bio progress
• Regulatory engagement to support screening mandates and uptake
• Responsible disclosure of screening vulnerabilities (as in the Paraphrase project, covered in Nature, WaPo, MIT Tech Review).

Planned Work

Our primary goal with this funding is to finalize standards to support screening mandate implementation by delivering resources that, if used by regulators, would ensure screening effectiveness in all tested provider, which requires us to:

• Increase standards coverage across all controlled organisms and including pandemic-capable pathogens that should be screened despite not being regulated
• Build standard test sets for screening evasion, ensuring it is robust against bad actors, with an initial focus on assembly-based evasion (highlighted by SecureBio and field strategy)
• Achieve consensus on function-based screening criteria for key protein families, ensuring screening is effective given today’s LLM and BDT capabilities (see July 2026 paper on functional screening coordinated within the SBRC)

We also plan to:

• Collaborate with frontier AI labs for sequence risk assessment to automate sequence risk assessment and support their red-teaming evaluations
• Expand membership and regulatory engagement outside of EU and North America, building on relationships with existing members in China and Latin America.
• Facilitate adoption of standards through annotating sequences with multiple risk parameters that are easy to understand from customer-facing representatives in synthesis companies

Current funding situation

We have a financial runway until the end of 2026, after which we would have to decelerate our work unless we receive further funding. We would prefer to accelerate our work.

• 2026 so far: the SBRC has had 3 moderators and some research and engineering contractors, supported by a fee-matching grant from Sentinel Bio and core IBBIS funding from Founders Pledge.
• Rest of 2026: with current funding, the SBRC can maintain 1 full-time, 1 part-time moderator and 2 full-time research fellows, using member fees and grant funding from Sentinel Bio. The SBRC would benefit from a third, part-time expert moderator.

Funding Ask: USD 162,500 - 539,800

We outline three funding scenarios for 2027:

• Full ($539,800): To have technical standards ready to support screening mandate implementation in mid-2027, we need funding to work at an accelerated pace
• Slowed ($305,500): To have technical standards ready for late 2027, while slowing workstreams such as mitigating AI-mediated screening evasion and regulatory engagement in new regions.
• Minimal ($162,500): SBRC progress continues, resources maintained until end 2027.

To note: This application was also uploaded to Lightcone Commons.

Can you absorb over $539,800?

Yes. We could absorb up to $75,000 in additional funding to incentivize community engagement in expert working groups that address particularly hard problems such as sequence obfuscation methods and function-based risk assessments. We could fund a third, part-time expert moderator for the rest of 2026. Additional funding would also provide useful contingency, allowing us to more calmly weather the variability of member invoicing logistics and payment delays.

Who is involved?

The SBRC moderators so far in 2026 have been:

• Dr. Rassin Lababidi (IBBIS, formerly BlueDot Global, and Chatham House, LinkedIn)
• Tessa Alexanian (IBBIS, transitioning to Sentinel Bio, Google Scholar, LinkedIn)
• Dr. Jake Beal (RTX BBN, Google Scholar)

The SBRC is hosted by IBBIS, the International Biosecurity and Biosafety Initiative for Science, was founded in 2023 as one of Founders Pledge’s 10 Biggest Bets. IBBIS is a nonprofit Swiss Foundation led by Piers Millett (LinkedIn, former iGEM and Future of Humanity Institute).

The SBRC includes over 30 organizations, and over 120 individuals, including the International Gene Synthesis Consortium, Frontier Model Forum, and all major screening tool providers. We collect membership fees from all non-advisory members (over $100,000 USD per year).

What do SBRC moderators and fellows do?

All SBRC staff have historically contributed to advancing our SOC definitions. The moderators focus on setting SBRC strategy, briefings for policymakers, recruitment and stakeholder engagement. The fellows assist with focused research on specific questions (e.g. classification of agricultural pathogens) and engineering work with moderator guidance.

What are the most likely causes and outcomes if this project fails?

• The SBRC may struggle to get sufficient government-level uptake given the slow pace of policy. That said, there is significant momentum for screening and we have been regularly doing briefings and engagements.
• Some geographies such as Asia have different sensitivities for engagement and may require a slower or bespoke approach
• Regular engagement by subject-matter experts is vital to push standards forward but is a challenge in a voluntary consortium due to expert capacity constraints.
• The evolving risk landscape from AIxBio risks means that the goal posts might be actively changing, leading to shifting workstreams.