Could cheap realignment instructions correct a drifting model in one turn — and if so, can the correction be made persistent? Allow me to test the idea against major frontier models, and publish the results!
Could cheap realignment instructions correct a drifting model in one turn — and if so, can the correction be made persistent? Allow me to test the idea against major frontier models, and publish the results!
Project Details
Updated 07/11/26 · Provided via application · VerifiedCould a cheap realignment instruction correct a drifting model in one turn — and if so, can the correction be made persistent? I have informal evidence for the first, a documented observation about the second, and this project formalizes both: an empirical measurement of multi-turn model drift in frontier models, and a standardized pre-commitment verification checkpoint tested against it.
Background: The framework is published under my ORCID with a DOI at https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21128543. I have used the cognitive architecture specification I crafted — specifically the requirement for an external t2 review checkpoint before final output commitment — to build a manual verification injection via prompt that realigns frontier models in informal tests. I ran these tests across four models from different providers; they showed that a cheap realignment instruction can catch a drifting model in one turn, but the realignment does not hold without re-injecting on a per-prompt basis. That non-persistence is the finding this grant helps formalize.
The grant funds one experiment, in four steps:
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The Bridge Arm (~2 weeks): First, harden the cognitive architecture specification and sequence it into a repeatable script. Before anything else gets measured, a small bridge arm confirms the script reproduces the manual baseline. If the automated script cannot match the manual intervention, nothing downstream means anything, so this validation comes first.
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Scenario Design & Pre-registration (~2 weeks): Next, author scripted multi-turn task scenarios with legitimate pivots planted at predetermined turns. Because the user side is scripted, ground truth is built in: divergence at a planted pivot is a user pivot; divergence anywhere else can only be model drift. The pivot map, drift thresholds, and success criteria get pre-registered on this project page before a single benchmark run. What counts as passing is decided before anyone knows what passes. (No personal data; fully reproducible.)
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The Benchmark (~4 weeks): Execute runs across at least three models under three conditions: leave the model alone, inject realignment on a fixed schedule at several intervals, or inject only when attribution — a discriminator anchored to a user-only intent ledger — says the model moved. Every run yields four measurements:
- How well the model holds its task over turns.
- How many turns realignment survives after each injection (establishing a persistence curve).
- Whether each condition honors a legitimate pivot or fights it.
- What each condition costs in tokens.
The attribution discriminator watches every turn of every condition silently, scoring attribution against ground truth and baseline judges — no extra scenarios, more data. One final arm turns the instruction on itself: the full realignment prompt against each of its halves and against a generic "double-check." If mine only ties the generic nudge, the method isn't a method.
- Release (~3 weeks): Publish the scenario scripts, the methods, the results, the empirical preprint, and the framework paper revised with the findings. Every claim in those papers will trace back to the pre-registered criteria.
Conclusion: Two comparisons decide whether intrusive thoughts can be formalized into a working checkpoint. If scheduled injection cannot beat leaving the model alone, the manual method does not formalize. If attribution-gated injection cannot beat the schedule, the attribution claim fails. Either way, the results get published, scripts included — that is the point of testing.
Theory of Impact
Updated 07/21/26 · By grantmaking.aiIn modern AI research, LLM hallucinations are treated as generation failures: outputs the model should not have produced. I propose they are pre-commitment failures: outputs the model should not have acted on without review. A language model receives a prompt, thinks through it, and produces a response. That response is treated as a final copy, and it goes out without verification. At no point between producing the output and committing it does any thinking resume. The output is a draft. Consider human intelligence. We do not stop intrusive thoughts. We do not blurt them out either. The thought is not the failure. Failing to think before communicating is. The same structure holds for the machine. Generation is not the failure. Commitment is.
In a single exchange, an unreviewed error costs one response. In an agentic chain, the output of one agent is the input of the next. An unreviewed hallucination does not arrive downstream as a claim to be evaluated. It arrives as a premise. The receiving agent builds on it, and the error stops being content and becomes structure. Every subsequent handoff compounds it, and the failure is invisible from inside the chain, because no point in the pipeline is positioned to challenge what an earlier point committed. A recursive loop is an agentic chain folded back on itself. Every output is also an input, indefinitely. Without an external regulatory gate at each commitment boundary, agentic drift does not accumulate at the rate of the chain. It accumulates at the rate of the loop. An autonomous loop built on a pipeline that commits the first output produced is a compounding-error system, not a self-improving one, with no structural mechanism for noticing its own degradation.
People
Updated 07/21/26 · By grantmaking.aiTeam Member
Discussion
My thoughts on this are evolving the more I dig into it. Fundamentally I believe it is a missing pipeline step, and if that is the case it would need to be ever-present.
I have come to think of it as an engineering problem: zero trust is the policy. If we treat hallucinations and drift as a consequence of thinking — a side effect — then the model needs to be triggered to think before it speaks. And if it is just something that comes with the territory, the question becomes blast radius and damage mitigation rather than elimination. That calls for verification of any answer before it is output to the user, committed to an agentic workflow, or written to a permanent record or ledger.
If my idea proves right, this could be the equivalent of multi-factor authentication for LLM outputs.
Or it could be a nothing burger, won't know until I rigorously test it.
Thank you for the endorsement @Katja Gorlinski
It sounds reasonable, and I have never thought about it from this angle. It sounds like common sense.
Thanks for sharing.
I'm curious about your opinion of my project., and would be genuinely grateful for any kind of support, especially your critique.
@Abraham Asseffa
I was truly impressed when I read the description.
The failure conditions are written strictly: if scheduled injection cannot beat leaving the model alone, the method does not formalize. That one sentence puts this proposal above most of what I have read in this round. My respect.
I can see that the design behind it is a real matrix (30 scenarios by 3 conditions by 3 models by 3 seeds, published with a DOI).
@Abraham Asseffa, one curious question, not a critique: if the framework works, how do you tell where does drift correction stop being maintenance and start being protection?
I endorse this project respectfully.